Peter Mattis, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191001_China_Grand_Strategy_Part%203_.pdf), • PART FOUR: THE SUPERPOWER BALANCE AND CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY addresses Chinese official views of the shift in the global military balance in its 2019 Defense White Paper and the contrasting official views of OSD and DIA, and then provides a range of different quantitative assessments of the global military balance between China, the U.S. and Russia that shows the extent to which each nation can compete as a “superpower.” It compares the very different Chinese, OSD, DIA, IISS, and SIPRI estimates of defense spending by China, the U.S., Russia, and other powers, It provides summaries of Chinese and OSD views of China’s expanding technology base, and analyzes the importance of arms transfer to both improving China’s military technology and its level of influence over other states. Senior Study Group members express their support for the general findings and recommendations reached by the group, but do not necessarily endorse every statement or judgment in the report. China’s appeal lies in offering development financing where the strings attached are related to Beijing’s concerns, such as political issues like Hong Kong, contracting with Chinese firms, adopting Chinese standards, and gaining strategic access. Dave Rank, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, Yale University The size of some of these PowerPoints may present problems for some IT systems, but quick comparisons of different Chinese and U.S. policy statements and assessments, and of the graphics and data that summarize the trends and issues involved are only possible if PowerPoint is used. U.S. assistance in renegotiating project terms with China could be provided where it can be helpful, as in Myanmar, but policymakers should avoid getting pulled into unsustainable projects in the course of trying to compete with China. Washington might also find a way to engage the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, perhaps by accrediting the U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh as a representative to the organization. In some places, however, democratically elected leaders abuse power. The United States and like-minded countries have an obligation to act to end the ongoing atrocities and to protect the Uyghur people. But strategic pressure from Beijing will likely make the case in New Delhi for bolder moves, such as hastening the modernization of India’s military, conducting joint military exercises, making the U.S.-Australia-Japan-India Quad militarily effective, and expanding intelligence cooperation and military interoperability to get closer to Washington and other democratic partners. Jacqueline Deal, Long Term Strategy Group LLC The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that China has become a both a major recipient of global FDI as well as a major provider of FDI outflows (see Figure 13). Even more important, standards consultations should shape the legal and policy regimes governing new technologies to manage trade-offs on privacy, security, data ownership and access, and accountability. Broaden the scope of U.S. engagement with South Asia to fully integrate the region into a free and open Indo-Pacific vision. These include high-standard U.S. private investment as an alternative to Chinese investment, good governance advanced through programs like the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Blue Dot Network certification, and contributing to maritime security, disaster preparedness, and climate resilience. Deepen ties with India—along with facilitating New Delhi’s cooperation with U.S. allies and partners in Asia and Europe—across diplomatic, economic, technology, and military areas. Daniel Blumenthal, American Enterprise Institute • A PDF version of the full report is available on the CSIS web site (https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-united-states-cooperation-competition-andor-conflict) as well, which can be accessed here (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191001_China_Grand_Strategy.pdf). China's full emergence as a superpower is still at least a decade away, and is often hard or impossible to reliably predict. Meanwhile, the United States has mostly backed India’s position in flare-ups along the Line of Control and New Delhi’s responses to terrorist attacks in India traced to Pakistan. This is why other graphics, maps, and charts are provided that draw on work developed by a wide range of think tanks and research centers — including the IISS, SIPRI, and the CSIS. Globalization is the word used to describe the growing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information.Countries have built economic partnerships to facilitate these movements over many centuries. - Voice of America. The relationship is also buoyed by military ties and diplomatic support, which further entrench the army’s role in Pakistan’s government and strengthen illiberalism within Pakistan. The United States can offer independent election monitoring to forestall election disputes, create independent media alternatives where a lack of media freedom diminishes the functioning of democracy, offer journalism training and scholarships, provide training for political party leaders in de facto one-party states, and help organize for the protection of minorities. Major Chinese investments in Pakistan are less harmful to U.S. interests than they could be in other places and are likely to result in blowback against Chinese interests eventually. China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia. The surveys in each section and subsection that then draw on graphic material and analysis taken from official sources, as well as from research by a variety of thinks and media sources. In countries where China exerts a strong influence, its engagement can have a substantial impact on local and international efforts to curb violence and extremism. Some issues in South Asia should be insulated from the strategic competition between the United States and China, that is, not used to gain geopolitical leverage against Beijing. Research, policy analysis, and track 2 dialogues on nuclear and strategic stability between both adversarial nuclear dyads in South Asia—India-Pakistan and India-China—need to be encouraged. To that end, leveraging the tools of power where the United States has a comparative advantage will be more effective than trying to outpace China where it has an edge. It then provides similar excerpts from the new U.S. national security and national defense strategy that the United States issued in 2017 and 2018, and from assessments of Chinese strategy by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, DIA, and INDOPACOM. However, the goal of engaging in South Asian multilateral groups ought to be to signal a long-term U.S. commitment to the region, as well as to learn more about local concerns—not to be drawn deeper into squabbles between neighbors. But monitoring implementation details will be crucial, and additional actions will likely prove necessary to ensure South Asian economies can avoid the worst potential outcomes. Andrew Wilder, United States Institute of Peace, Project Director: Jacob Stokes, United States Institute of Peace To the extent that China’s infrastructure investment spurs regional integration in a transparent way and at a sustainable cost, it can be a genuine common good. Writing Off Afghanistan: Does Biden Have a Choice? Seen from this perspective, such trends clearly that show that China already is a true economic superpower with growing resources and a steadily improving technology base. Chiang Kai-shek (31 October 1887 – 5 April 1975), also known as Chiang Chung-cheng and romanized via Mandarin as Chiang Chieh-shih and Jiang Jieshi, was a Chinese Nationalist politician, revolutionary and military leader who served as the leader of the Republic of China between 1928 and 1975, first in mainland China until 1949 and then in Taiwan until his death. However, it is essential to remain clear-eyed about China’s record of employing coercive actions in international disputes and abandoning diplomatic agreements when doing so advantages Beijing. Alyssa Ayres, Council on Foreign Relations It’s time for the international community to take stock of the atrocity prevention toolkit, to consider why it has failed the Uyghurs, and to discuss how these failures can inform updates or adaptations to respond to the Xinjiang crisis. If these current trends continue — China has the future capacity to equal or surpass the U.S. economy and U.S. military forces at some point during the next two decades. South Asian states are largely fragile democracies. Washington needs to have a frank dialogue in noncrisis moments about the prospects for future crises, what role the United States and China may or may not play, and the consequences that could occur in a nuclear crisis, including setbacks to the Indo-Pacific strategy. Early in 2021, the new administration should commission a National Intelligence Estimate of China’s maritime activities in the Indian Ocean and its rimland areas, including both commercial and military moves. Sameer Lalwani, Stimson Center Even as the United States prioritizes the India partnership, it should not foreclose on a valuable relationship with Pakistan and cede all influence to China. The net assessment is divided into eight major sections: • PART ONE: CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY provides summaries of China’s evolving strategy using direct quotes from its key white papers, particularly its 2019 Defense White Paper. A rich literature on China’s relations with South Asia exists and continues to expand. At the same time, Washington should look to disenchantment created by CPEC as an opportunity to rebalance U.S.-Pakistan ties with more modest expectations on both sides. U.S. policymakers should make clear to leaders in New Delhi the U.S. view that India’s democratic system—including respect for pluralism and human rights—is a strategic asset that facilitates India’s natural alignment with the United States and other democratic states around the world. Daniel Markey, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191001_China_Grand_Strategy_Part%206.pdf), • PART SEVEN: CHINESE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING OTHER ASIAN POWERS covers China’s official position on its strategic relations with every major power on its borders, the official U.S. view of China’s strategic relations with each state, and the sources of Chinese tension or cooperation. Finally, the United States should enlist other countries in Taiwan’s defense. Washington needs to conduct quiet coordination and dialogue with regional countries to address Chinese disinformation efforts and Chinese technology gray zone tactics. Through treaty commitments with Japan, a military confrontation could involve the United States. Along the way, their first stop is South Asia, which this report defines as comprising eight countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—along with the Indian Ocean (particularly the eastern portions but with implications for its entirety). Washington should coordinate with other democracies to maximize the impact of international support in these areas. Over the last decade, China has become more engaged internationally, including in conflict zones and fragile states of strategic interest to the United States. At the same time, New Delhi should be encouraged to build up its capabilities to deter Beijing, while also recognizing that India’s actions are likely to prompt further Chinese counterbalancing and the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will severely constrain India’s ability to fund military improvements. Tanvi Madan, Brookings Institution But it is also one whose economic growth prior to the COVID-19 pandemic was robust, that has a demographic dividend, and whose vibrant independent states are grappling with the challenges of democratic governance—including the world’s largest democracy in India.